22 Aug Stones for Shepherds: UAS as a Force Multiplier and Deterrent Model in Ukraine
By Caleb Bailey
August 2024
Well-regarded as a force multiplier, aerial drones (generally referred to as UAS) have been employed by the armed forces for years to conduct intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) operations during the Global War on Terror.[1] These efforts also saw larger remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) used for a variety of missions previously reserved for crewed aircraft.[2] However, most of these sorties were limited to permissive airspace; areas where no hostile air defense network exists.[3] Furthermore, their wide scale success had not previously been demonstrated against conventional military forces consisting of substantial naval, armor, and air power in contested environments. That has changed in Ukraine. Footage continues to leak out from eastern Europe of Ukrainian drones rigged with explosives or other ordinance engaging Russian forces with great success.[4] While the trenches and artillery lining the Russo-Ukrainian frontlines invoke imagery of wars past, the conflict is a stark commentary on the evolution of modern warfare.[5] As a result, this conflict will continue to reshape force design down to the individual warfighter as well as conflict endurance.
Force Design and Procurement
Drones have contributed heavily to Ukraine’s military restructuring, presenting a case study for future force design. Throughout the war both aerial and naval drone systems represent a significant prong of Ukraine’s novel strategy against Russia’s Black Sea Fleet.[6] While Ukraine once had a major warship in the region prior to the war, it now maintains no blue-water vessels in its navy and has instead prioritized drone and missile strikes.[7] The results speak for themselves. According to the latest claims, drone and missile operations have taken a large portion of Russia’s fleet in the Black Sea out of the war.[8] Some estimates report a fifth of its pre-war fleet destroyed or disabled,[9] others reporting up to a third.[10] Currently, the count includes one cruiser, four large amphibious assault ships, a submarine, a supply ship, and “several corvettes, patrol boats, and small landing craft” damaged or sunk by Ukraine’s efforts.[11] One point is clear: Ukraine lacks major naval assets in the Black Sea, yet is dealing heavy blows to Russian forces there at a fraction of the cost. In response to this aggressive shift in naval tactics, Russia has made efforts to procure and deploy smaller vessels in the area, serving as protective anti-air units for their larger assets.[12] However, as demonstrated by the record even these ships are falling prey to drone and missile attacks.[13] Ukraine’s restructuring in the Black Sea has paid large dividends and has profound tactical and economic implications for States engaging conventional forces. States that lack the need for blue-water prestige and global projection may still opt for more drone-and-missile-driven forces. While total replacement may be dramatic, drone integration into national strategy even against global powers may improve resiliency.
Combat Situational Awareness and Force Projection
UAS technologies specifically are rapidly changing the situational awareness and ordinance on land as well. The failure of either side to formally secure air supremacy has left much of the ground campaign in a stalemate, the imagery resembling the trench and artillery warfare of World War I.[14] Where information gathering in the field would otherwise be hazardous, individual fighters commonly employ personal UAVs to gather information in real time.[15] Furthermore, some UAS systems have been outfitted to drop explosives, giving individual Ukrainian soldiers a sort of personalized artillery.[16] These elements are localizing air support, which for a nation lacking substantial air assets is paramount to striking targets not visible on the infantry level. These efforts afford wide-scale individual empowerment and are likely to govern tactics on the warfighter level. By delegating airpower-adjacent effects to individuals, smaller forces are increasingly credible against armor and more significantly even strategic elements playing a part in Russia’s nuclear infrastructure.[17] As a result, the blows to Russian forces through drone intelligence gathering and airstrikes have largely undermined some of Russia’s greatest advantages over Ukraine.[18]
Improved Conflict Sustainability
Separate from the individual military successes, drone technology has played a larger role in several economic and geopolitical implications to sustain the Ukrainian defense. First, international military funding is both used more efficiently and more easily justified. Ukrainian forces are demonstrating new tactics that are both innovative and cost-effective, and in the digital age (partly due to the drone assets themselves) proof of success is easily viewed by Ukraine’s allies through social media.[19] In the partisan and often lethargic world of congressional appropriations, this demonstrable success provides the needed evidence to authorize even small spending packages with this strategy in mind.[20]
Second, Ukraine’s reconstructed efforts to wage naval warfare have released economic pressure on the country.[21] As a result of the losses suffered by the Black Sea Fleet, Russian Forces have largely pulled east of several Ukrainian Black Sea ports.[22] This reduction in pressure has created an economic corridor allowing for resumed Ukrainian grain exports.[23] This is by and large a global benefit, as Ukrainian grain is a substantial part of Ukraine’s economy and feeds a substantial portion of both Africa and Asia.[24] Wars are often won not only on the front line but also by the supply chains that feed them. Both the continued support of allies abroad and sustained economic activity are critical for the Ukrainian supply chain. As shown, drones both in application and by proxy lend themselves as supporting the Ukrainian defense and economy, sustaining the war effort.
Applications for the Indo-Pacific
While it might be surprising to see small-scale adjustments in military strategy and technology playing such large roles in geopolitics, drones will continue to disrupt preexisting strategy. As shown, drones are likely to shape the future of force design on the service and warfighter levels and improve the sustainability of forces encountering unfavorable odds. While this certainly raises concerns for the United States in preserving its conventional forces, it is also an invaluable case study for U.S. allies looking to preserve their interests against larger State actors. For example, Ukraine’s successes may provide the framework for smaller nations subject to harassment by China in the South China Sea. Harboring a larger naval presence than any of its continental neighbors, China often uses this force in its territorial claims resulting in rather hostile confrontations.[25] Even prior to a large-scale conflict, a smaller nation such as the Philippines now has valid deterrents despite their smaller conventional military. Such new strength comes from the smaller warfighting components, which includes UAS technology. As demonstrated, as the bullies of the world further their geopolitical exploits, technologies such as UAS may prove to be one of many stones able to take down these Goliaths.
[1] James Poss, Where We Are With ISR, Inside Unmanned Systems (Oct. 31, 2022), https://insideunmannedsystems.com/where-we-are-with-isr/
[2] Id.
[3] Id.
[4] Illia Novikov, High-tech sea drones used to sink another Russian warship in the Black sea, Ukraine claims, PBS (Mar. 5, 2024), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/high-tech-sea-drones-used-to-sink-another-russian-warship-in-the-black-sea-ukraine-claims#:~:text=Last%20month%2C%20Ukraine%20claimed%20it,the%20Caesar%20Kunikov%20landing%20ship.
[5] Shuichi Kurumada, War in Ukraine highlights importance of cutting-edge technology in conflict, The Japan Times (Jan. 5, 2023), https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2023/01/05/commentary/world-commentary/ai-russia-ukraine/
[6] Igor Delanoë, Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine, The Foreign Policy Research Institute (Feb. 7, 2024), https://www.fpri.org/article/2024/02/russias-black-sea-fleet-in-the-special-military-operation-in-ukraine/
[7] Id.
[8] Svitlana Vlasova and Brad Lendon, Ukraine’s drones sink another Russian warship, Kyiv says, CNN (Mar. 6, 2024), https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/05/europe/russian-warship-destroyed-ukraine-intl-hnk-ml/index.html
[9] David Axe, Ukraine’s Drone Boats Blew Up A Russian Warship Three Weeks Ago. But Few People Noticed Until Now., Forbes (Jan. 19, 2024), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidaxe/2024/01/19/ukraines-drone-boats-blew-up-a-russian-warship-three-weeks-ago-but-few-people-noticed-until-now/?sh=695d6b5724ef
[10] Svitlana Vlasova and Brad Lendon, Ukraine’s drones sink another Russian warship, Kyiv says, CNN (Mar. 6, 2024), https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/05/europe/russian-warship-destroyed-ukraine-intl-hnk-ml/index.html
[11] Axe, supra note 8.
[12] Delanoë, supra note 5.
[13] Axe, supra note 8.
[14] Delanoë, supra note 5.
[15] David Axe, Ukraine’s $10,000 Drones Are Dropping Tiny Bombs On Russian Troops, Forbes (April 13, 2022),
[16] Id.
[17] Xiaodon Liang, Ukraine Strikes Russian Early-Warning Radar, Arms Control Association (Aug. 2024), https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2024-07/news/ukraine-strikes-russian-early-warning-radars.
[18] Delanoë, supra note 5.
[19] Sachin Ravikumar and Kate Holton, UK to supply thousands of drones to Ukraine, Reuters (Feb. 15, 2024), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/uk-supply-thousands-drones-ukraine-2024-02-15/#:~:text=LONDON%2C%20Feb%2015%20(Reuters),is%20co%2Dleading%20with%20Latvia.
[20] Id.
[21] Axe, supra note 8.
[22] Id.
[23] Noah Berman and Mariel Ferragamo, How Ukraine Overcame Russia’s Grain Blockade, Council on Foreign Relations (February 27, 2024), https://www.cfr.org/article/how-ukraine-overcame-russias-grain-blockade
[24] Id.
[25] Rebecca Wright, Ivan Watson and Kevin Broad, What it’s like on board an outnumbered Philippine ship facing down China’s push to dominate the South China Sea, CNN (Mar. 6, 2024), https://www.cnn.com/2024/03/06/asia/philippines-china-south-china-sea-confrontation-intl-hnk-dst/index.html